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EXPERTISE AND THE DAUBERT
DECISION
Ronald J. Allen*
Trials in the Anglo-American tradition were originally the
means by which conventional disputes were resolved. The original
mode of trial gathered together individuals with knowledge of local
affairs to decide notorious disputes. The existence of disputes was
part of conventional knowledge, as was the knowledge necessary to
resolve them. The local conventions determining borders or access
to bodies of water or the proper maintenance of property were truly
conventions, and thus known throughout the relevant community.
As times changed, various forces coalesced to force modification in
the self-informing aspect of juries, but the result was modification
rather than rejection. Contrary to today's conventional beliefs
about legal decision making, juridical decision makers, judge or
jury,' are still almost exclusively self-informing. The current belief
that fact finders must come with a blank slate is false in every respect
save one.
The belief is false in the technical sense that knowledge about
the litigated event is typically not a disqualification; only knowledge
that would qualify a person as a witness disqualifies the person as a
juror.2 The conventional belief about the necessary ignorance of
jurors is false in a deeper sense. Juridical decision makers come to
trial with a vast storehouse of knowledge, beliefs, and modes of reasoning that are necessary to permit communication to occur simply
and efficiently. Everyone in court is expected to speak the same language; rarely do trials have lexicographic diversions to elaborate on
the definitions of the words that witnesses, lawyers, or judges use.
* John Henry Wigmore Professor of Law, Northwestern University. I am indebted
to the participants of the Northwestern University School of Law Faculty Workshop for
many helpful comments and criticisms.
I Henceforth "jury" usually means judges as well.
2 For example, a case that I was involved in had a jury that was fully aware that my
client had been convicted of the exact crime he was being tried for in another state. The
jurors selected testified on voire dire that they would be able to set that knowledge aside
and decide the case on the evidence presented, and thus they qualified as jurors. Heath
v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985).

1157

1158

RONALDJ. ALLEN

[Vol. 84

Everyone is expected to have a firm grip on the nature of reality and
the existence of causal relationships (whatever Hume might have
thought of the justification of such beliefs). Everyone is expected to
be able to engage in orderly reasoning, whether deductive, inductive, or even on occasion abductive, and to be able to perceive the
relationship between evidence and propositions, between cause and
effect. Everyone is expected to be able to understand what the witnesses say, to perceive the connection between what they say and
the matters under investigation at trial, and to make reasoned judgments about the credibility of witnesses. Less well known, everyone
is expected to be able to fill in the evidentiary gaps at trial that result
from many factors (including that individual witnesses always know
more than they can express) by drawing inferences based on one's
own experiences to give flesh to the bones of testimony.
Over time litigated matters became more complex, and the gap
of ignorance separating the fact finders from the witnesses increased. More and more frequently what witnesses said had to be
explained to make it understandable. A case may depend on the
conventions of a certain business or industry rather than the conventions of the society at large, and jurors will often need to be informed of those conventions. A witness may not speak English, and
thus the testimony must be translated.3 The case may involve a
technical vocabulary that, like a foreign vocabulary, must be made
accessible to those lacking the technical training. As such cases became more common, we continued to adhere to the traditional
model of fact finding. The parties were merely obligated to explain
a little bit more, to put the juror in a position to understand what
the witnesses were saying, and thus to decide the case in an intelligent fashion.
Are there any cases that cannot be accommodated within the
traditional model? Do some cases present issues for decision that
defy the ability of fact finders to understand them? Perhaps the answer to these questions is "no." Perhaps with enough time and resources, jurors can be sufficiently informed so that they can decide
intelligently all litigated cases. Yet now another set of questions
lurks in the shadows: At what cost is this knowledge purchased, and
is the bargain a wise one? Would resources be better used elsewhere? Who should decide on what "better" use of resources may
be available? These are the questions that the Supreme Court
3 Apparently a party can insist on it being translated. In Hernandez v. New York,
111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991), the Supreme Court upheld the exclusion of Spanish-speaking
jurors in a case in which some witnesses would testify in Spanish on the ground that the
jurors might not accept the translator's rendition of the testimony.
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faced, whether consciously or not, in the recent case of Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc.,4 and they are the questions that I
address in this essay.
The answer to the first question, whether there are cases that
defy the ability of fact finders to understand them, seems clear
enough upon reflection, even though it may be counterintuitive, and
the answer is surely "no." The deficits of juridical fact finders are
not cognitive; they are informational. Judges and jurors lack knowledge about various branches of human inquiry, as we all do, but
there is little reason to believe that, with instruction, they could not
adequately master the relevant fields. 5 Ironically, and again
counterintuitively, jurors, because they sit on juries, are probably
better able to master the relevant subjects thanjudges. The issue is
not whether every single juror understands adequately every single
issue, but whether the jury adequately understands. 6 With the
wealth of talent almost always contained in even a randomly selected group of six to twelve individuals, it would be a remarkable
case that truly defied their collective cognitive abilities. I do not
deny that such a case might occur, but I do deny that such a low
7
probability event is of much significance to social planning.
This argument may not be just counterintuitive; it may appear
to be disproven by common experience. Many ideas, especially in
their youth, are extremely difficult to grasp. A good example is Einsteinian relativity theory, which was understood by only a small
handful of individuals for a considerable time following its creation.
But, I don't know of any case that required for decision an understanding of general relativity theory, and I know of no analogous
4 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).

5 Bear in mind that the question is not whether the jury ends up understanding all
there is to know about a field, or even knows as much as does any particular expert. The
question is whether the jury knows or can learn enough for rational deliberation.
6 If not every juror adequately understands, "deference" will obviously occur in the
jury room, with the more baffled jurors deferring to the ostensibly less baffled ones.
Nonetheless, at least decision will have been moved from outside the juridical process to
back inside it, whether for good or for ill.
7 Richard Epstein implies that the very low probability, worst case scenario should
be influential in determining social policy. Richard Epstein, Judicial Control over Expert
Testimony: Of Deference and Education, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 1156 (1993). Perhaps he is right,
but at a minimum the implications of the competing worst case scenarios must be considered. In his example, a single irrational jury verdict may indeed put a company out of
business or result in a drug being removed from the market, but that is the worst case
scenario only if we already know that liability should not be imposed. If liability should
be imposed, which is the competing worst case, then denying liability will leave numerous deserving plaintiffs uncompensated. This raises directly the political objectives
served by a litigation system, an issue I do not wish to explore. I wish to stay with the
simplifying assumption that plaintiffs and defendants are a priori indistinguishable.
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case, one involving string theory, for example. Perhaps there is one,
8
but again it would be the exception that proves the rule.
General relativity theory is not the only difficult idea to grasp.
Many individuals find calculus and probability theory obscure, for
example, and both are often integral to trials. But many people do
not find mathematics at this level obscure. In determining whether
a jury possessed the necessary tools for rational decision, again the
question is not whether all jurors do; it is whether the jury does.
Nor is the question whether the jury already knew enough about
calculus or probability; it is whether they could learn enough.
Moreover, if a case posed an issue requiring a certain technical or
mathematical capacity, that capacity could be a condition of serving
on the jury. This would make the seating of a jury no more difficult
than doing so in a notorious case.
The real objection to this argument is not that it is wrong; the
real objection is that it would be too costly. I certainly agree that
educating jurors adequately to decide intelligently cases with complicated issues would be costly. In many instances, the jurors would
literally have to go to school, or at least have the school brought to
them. One can easily imagine cases that would require months of
instruction before jurors would be competent to decide intelligently. It is, however, much more difficult to find cases that would
defy this educational process, which brings us full circle.
But the circle produces a paradox. There are many cases that
do not involve scientific or technical questions but do require
months of instruction so that the jury can understand them. In
these cases we do not permit juror deference to juridical outsiders
such as experts; we require the parties to connect the case through
evidence to the experience of the jurors. Why, then, do we flirt
with, and perhaps adopt, a more deferential mode when something
comes into court labeled "expert testimony"? 9 If I am right, the
8 Similarly, that experts like witnesses know more than they can communicate does
not disprove my point. Experts may very well develop intuitive skills that could not be
imparted to a jury. Still, the question is whether those skills matter for rational decision
in any particular litigated case. If deciding a case actually reduced to a choice between
the hunches of experts that cannot be further explained, it most likely does not belong
in the conventional system of litigation.
9 Deference and education are not analytically distinct entities; they are opposite
points on a spectrum. Jurors will virtually never see true "raw" data at trial. Deference
occurs to some extent whenever ajury decides a witness has testified truthfully. See, e.g.,
Richard Lempert, Experts, Stories, and Information, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 1169 (1993). Still,
the extent of deference, or of education, is a variable; one can have more of one and less
of the other. This is particularly obvious when one considers a case involving not just
reporting of sensory experience ("The light was red.") but the drawing of inferences
("In light of these studies, I am of the opinion that Bendectin causes birth defects."). In
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cognitive questions are highly similar, even if not identical, in both
sets of cases. The economic questions are truly identical. In all
cases, parties must take into account the costs of presenting their
cases, and responding to their opponents' cases, in determining
their optimal strategy. This variable is independent of the conventional/expert distinction. The economics of public subsidy are also
highly analogous if not identical. All trials have public subsidies,
such as the cost of the courthouse and various governmental salaries. From the public point of view, a subsidy to a six-month trial
that involved educating the jury about calculus is no different from
the subsidy to a six-month bank fraud trial. If there is a difference, it
favors the subsidy in support of the instruction in calculus, as that
might lead to social benefits that are very difficult to see flowing
from the educational effort directed toward the jury in a bank fraud
case.
Perhaps the difference between complex conventional cases
and cases that call for expert testimony is that the latter demand
expertise that is missing from the former. People do possess specialized nonconventional knowledge about mathematics, economics,
toxicology, oncology, and so on. Perhaps no one possesses expertise about complex conventional cases such as bank fraud or criminal conspiracies. Perhaps so, but this argues not for our current
system of presenting competing versions of expertise at trial, but
instead for a form of judicial notice.
If expertise exists and can be identified with the certainty that
the existence of Lake Michigan outside my window can be, trials
should not pause over it. Its lessons should be taken as true, and
the fact finder so constricted. Whether in any particular case there
is expertise in this sense should be easy to determine by judges or
legislatures, and its implications mined for what they are worth. We
would defer to such knowledge just as we defer to the indisputable
knowledge that Lake Michigan is outside my window. We would not
litigate whether Lake Michigan is outside my window; that would
simply waste resources. If expertise does exist, we waste resources
each time (at least beyond the first or after conditions have changed)
that we litigate the issue.
the typical case, the jury is supposed to be able to understand the reasoning process that
led the witness from observation to conclusion. Understanding may bring either acceptance or rejection, of course, and the decision will be made by the jury's own lights.
Often with experts there is no expectation that the reasoning process can be understood. Thus, acceptance or rejection cannot occur by the jury's own lights, and thus we
see a much larger dose of deference. How well a witness' analytical process can be understood is again clearly a variable. Some can be understood completely, some partially,
and some not at all. The legal question is the significance of this variable.
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We not only waste time when we litigate the existence of expertise; we also deliberately engage in nonsensical activity. One of the
reasons to litigate the existence of expertise is to provide opinions
to which jurors can defer. This is the opposite of education, of
course. Jurors are not expected to understand the relevant fields of
inquiry; they are simply to decide which expert to believe. How is
this to be done intelligently without understanding the relevant
fields? This question, which reverberates over the increasing use of
expertise at trial, has no satisfactory answer, precisely because the
two points cannot be reconciled. It is painfully obvious that jurors
(and judges) who do not know enough about the relevant fields of
knowledge to decide intelligently cannot decide intelligently which
expert to believe among those providing competing versions of that
field. 1 0 Obversely, ifjurors can decide intelligently about which expert to believe, they can with a little more education reason intelligently about the matters in issue, so that deference to the expert is
not necessary.
Out of this cauldron of concerns emerge three competing
methods of handling expert testimony, each with its own strengths
and weaknesses:
The Normal Approach: Expert testimony can be treated just like
any other testimony, which means for it to be relevant it must be
understandable by the fact finder. To make an expert's testimony
understandable will require the jury to be educated about the relevant matters, and thus the "normal approach" collapses into adopting an education model. The difficulty is cost, especially that cost
may skew decision toward those with greater resources. The more
impecunious a party, the less able he or she will be to provide the
necessary educative function, or to respond to an opponent's case.
The latter point is another detrimental aspect of our system's failure
to make parties bear the true cost of their cases, which includes the
opponent's cost of responding. Without cost shifting, a wealthier
party can make the cost of suit too high for the opponent. Adopting
the normal approach to expert testimony would exacerbate this
problem by tending to make cases involving expertise more protracted. Offsetting this factor in part is that higher costs are a laudable disincentive to sue or an equally laudable incentive to agree to
resolution in other, less costly, forums.
The Deference Model: Fact finders can be required to defer to established expertise. The advantages are obvious. Those with the
10 Consequently, even if my view of the cognitive capacity of juries is rejected, the
present system still is nonrational, and thus the central problem remains.
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ability to decide rationally make the decision, costs are reduced, and
consistency in decision is advanced. If the decisions about expertise
are correct, accuracy in decision should be advanced as well. The
disadvantage is the resultant extension of official orthodoxy, which
removes decision from the jury and trial judge to some higher level
court or legislature. Also, if the decision about expertise is incorrect, consistency of decision will remain, but the decisions will be
consistently wrong.
The Adversary Model: Parties can choose whether to educate the
jury, or convince them to defer to an expert. This leaves the whole
matter up to the parties, save only for the admissibility decision of
judges. That admissibility decision, in turn, would have to be made
in anticipation of either education or a request for deference.
Again, the advantages are obvious. The parties know their dispute
and their resources better than anyone else, and are in the best position to make choices that optimize their interests. The difficulties
are that the cost of education will tend to make deference more attractive and that deference cannot occur rationally with any great
frequency. The reduction in the likelihood of rationality is at odds
with the essence of the common law mode of trial-the pursuit of
factual accuracy through rational deliberation. Indeed, there is a
high irony here. In a case in which the parties are employing a deference mode, the mere admission by the trial judge of competing
expert views without requiring full explanation of those views, including instruction on the underlying field of inquiry, ensures that
decision will be nonrational if not irrational. Only if a juror could
see dearly that one side was right and the other wrong would nonrationality be avoided; but if that were so, the judge would admit only
the one version and exclude the other. If reasonable people could
rationally disagree about which expert is right, they in addition
would be able to understand the underlying dispute, and thus deference would not be needed. Note also what a dramatic qualification
of the normal rules of relevancy deference entails. Normally a party
must explain the relevance of evidence by adequately connecting
the evidence to the fact finder's understanding. With experts in a
deferential model, one party can shift that cost of explanation to the
opponent by producing an unexplained opinion.
As this brief presentation demonstrates, the use of expert testimony poses fundamental challenges to the common law system of
adjudication. This explains in part the remarkable controversy over
expert testimony even as expert testimony is becoming ever more
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prevalent at trial.1 ' Another part of the explanation is that the implications and corrosive effects of the deference/education distinc12
tion have only recently been identified and subjected to analysis.
An example is that the controversy over the Frye rule13 has focused
almost exclusively on its implications for judicial control over the
admission of expertise, with not a word written until recently recognizing that Frye encourages a system of deference. Similarly, those
who support a reading of the Federal Rules of Evidence that discards the Frye rule have not done so because of the resultant encouragement to the educational function. They have done so instead
because of the ambiguities in the rule, and the well founded belief
that it has lost touch with modem science. Nonetheless, lurking
here is the fundamental question of the nature of litigation: To
what extent is rational deliberation the hallmark of adjudication?
The Daubert case presented all these issues to the Court. The
Court dealt with only a few of them, one really, and that in a fairly
unenlightening way. The Court recognized that the Frye rule was
dead, but it resurrected the rule immediately following the burial.
The opinion reflected no recognition that what was at stake was not
just a technical rule of evidence but a conception of trial, and thus
the implications of its decision for rational deliberation were completely unaddressed. As for its reasoning, in the insightful language
of one of my students, "the Supreme Court replaced a judicial
anachronism with a philosophical one."' 14 The Court, in short and
as it usually does, left the law more or less as it was; and to the
extent there was change, the change was slightly for the good, as I
will now explain.
The plaintiffs in Daubert suffer from limb-reduction birth defects
allegedly caused by their mothers' use of Bendectin during pregnancy. The affirmative scientific support for their assertion came
solely from animal studies and chemical structural analyses of the
I' Evidence of the intense controversy currently brewing over expert testimony is
contained in the November 1993 Newsletter of the AALS Evidence Section. The editors
compile recent scholarship on the field of evidence. Of 55 professional articles, at least
19 could be identified from the title as investigating some aspect of expert testimony.
12 RonaldJ. Allen & Joseph S. Miller, The Common Law Theory of Experts: Deference or
Education, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 1131 (1993). This article is followed by five interesting
comments by Edward J. Imwinkelried, Richard A. Epstein, Paul R. Rice, Richard
Lempert, and Ronald L. Carlson.
13 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
14 Christopher Kamper, Paradigms Talking Past Each Other: Expert Testimony and
Problems of Translation (1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with TheJournalof Criminal Law & Criminology). This paper was written under my supervision in partial satisfaction of the requirements for Advanced Problems in Evidence.
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chemical. 1 5 A number of epidemiological studies of the effect of
Bendectin have been done, but none of them found statistically significant correlations between the use of Bendectin and birth defects.
Undeterred, the plaintiffs offered a reanalysis of the data of the epidemiological studies by well credentialed experts. 1 6 In essence,
their argument was that the structure of standard epidemiological
studies favors reducing Type I errors at the expense of making more
Type II errors.17 A Type I error is an erroneous finding of a causal
relationship where there is none between the drug and birth defects,
and a Type II error is an erroneous finding of no causation. Each of
the studies used the standard confidence level of 95%, which means
that the chances of erroneously rejecting the null hypothesis (and
thus erroneously concluding that there is a causal link) is less than
5%o.18 But accepting such a standard increases dramatically the
probability that the conclusion of no causation is false. For example, by one calculation, even if Bendectin caused a doubling in the
rate of birth defects, the probability that the published studies
would19 have yielded a statistically significant outcome is less than
207o.

The skewing of mistakes against erroneous findings of causation may seem odd to lawyers, but is plausible in the context of science. In tests such as those involving Bendectin, the issue generally
is whether the drug causes a particular result, such as increasing the
chances of birth defects. Causation of this sort is virtually always
highly complex, and thus essentially random outcomes occur relatively frequently making it difficult to sort out the precise effect of a
single variable. This is the standard difficulty of arguing from correlation to causation. In order to protect against an erroneous finding
of causation, most quantitative sciences have set high standards for
their experiments, such as the 95%o confidence level. That data do
not meet this standard, and thus that the null hypothesis is not rejected, does not mean there is no causal link; it means that this experiment did not find one, judged by the 95% confidence level.
20
Other experiments may come out differently.
The contemporary approach to experimentation is driven in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2791 (1993).
Id. at 2792.
17 Brief for Petitioners at 8-10, Daubert (No. 92-102).
18 Id. at 9.
19 Id. at 9-10.
20 There was more to the statistical presentation in the case than I have dealt with
here. I am merely trying to demonstrate in stark but nonetheless accurate fashion the
collision between the worlds of law and science. For a more complete treatment of the
statistical evidence in the case, see Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of
15
16
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part by one of the significant traits of modern science, which is the
emphasis on falsifiability. Following Popper, 2 ' experimental results
are often oriented toward falsifying rather than verifying hypotheses. The null hypothesis in the Bendectin studies is that Bendectin
does not cause birth defects. The studies did not give good ground
to reject that hypothesis; it was not falsified. It was not, however,
proven true. All a careful scientist would say is that it was not falsified by the data. This makes sense in the context of science because
there is no scientific statute of limitations. The concern is to get a
good approximation of reality over the long run. From that perspective, erroneous findings that some proposition is supported are
worse than conclusions that no significant results were obtained.
Erroneous findings of support would tend to generate belief in the
truth of the proposition, which in turn may infect the research program, whereas erroneous findings of no support will primarily generate further efforts at falsification.
Or at least so goes one aspect of the modern scientific self-conception. The legal self-conception is quite different, and herein lies
the most interesting aspect of the Bendectin litigation. In the law,
the typical civil case involves two indistinguishable parties fighting
over some good. As there is no reason to distinguish them a priori,
the law imposes a decision rule of a preponderance of the evidence
that is designed to generate about the same number of erroneous
verdicts for plaintiffs as for defendants. 22 The law assumes that an
erroneous rejection of the null hypothesis that defendant is not liable (thus erroneously finding for the plaintiff) is equivalent to an
erroneous rejection of the hypothesis that defendant is liable (thus
finding for the defendant). Two hundred dollars erroneously in
plaintiff's hands is difficult to distinguish from two hundred dollars
erroneously in defendant's hands.
Now we can see how dramatically the worlds of quantitative science and the law clash. The law wishes to scatter errors equally over
the parties; science wishes to reduce the number of false findings of
significant results. The true analogy is thus not between the law's
treatment of ambiguity in civil cases and science's use of significance
testing; the true analogy is between findings of guilt in criminal
cases and obtaining significant results. The criminal law skews error
in favor of the hypothesis of no criminal liability, just as quantitative
Evidence in Toxic Substances Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86
Nw. U. L. REV. 643 (1992).
21 KARL POPPER, OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE: AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH (1972).
22 Or perhaps to minimize the total number of errors. This nuance does not affect
the textual analysis.
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science skews errors in favor of findings of no causal link. The dissymmetry between civil cases and significance testing is what led the
plaintiffs to argue that, properly understood, the results of the epidemiological studies on Bendectin actually support the conclusion
of causation, if the law's burden of persuasion in civil cases is employed rather than that of science. If lower confidence levels are
employed in analyzing the Bendectin data, different, and "significant," results are obtained. This argument is highly analogous to
the legal principle that acquittal of a criminal charge is not in any
sense res judicata of a related civil claim. Merely because one fact
finder found a reasonable doubt about a criminal claim does not
preclude another fact finder from finding the claim to be true by a
23
preponderance of the evidence.
This is a very good argument, and it is one of the arguments
that the Supreme Court should have addressed, for it goes to the
heart of the clash between the legal and scientific worlds. 24 Regrettably, the Court focused on two other, considerably less important,
matters. The lower courts ruled in favor of the defendants on two
interrelated grounds. First, that the general acceptance standard of
Frye v. United States2 5 governed the admissibility of expert testimony
in federal court, and second that the standard could not be met with
evidence of reanalyses of data that had not previously been published and subjected to peer review. 26 The deep conceptual issue of
the defining characteristics of litigation was overlooked in the
Court's unenlightening, but thankfully not positively harmful, discussion of the general acceptance standard.
The Court reached the rather obvious conclusion, especially
obvious in light of the Court's consistently deferential treatment of
23 For example, in Dowling v. U.S., 493 U.S. 342 (1990), the defendant was acquitted
of a criminal charge. In a subsequent case, the act that formed the basis of the previous
charge was proffered under the prior bad act doctrine. Dowling argued it was inadmissible because of the prior determination of innocence. Id. at 342-44. The Court held to
the contrary, because of the differential standards of proof involved. Id. at 354.
24 The Court should also have addressed the question of the difference between the
admissibility and the sufficiency of the evidence. As the textual discussion points out
indirectly, arguments about significance levels are analogous to arguments about burdens of persuasion. The admissibility question is different; it is essentially the question
of relevance. Evidence is relevant if a reasonable person could be influenced by it.
Thus, epidemiological studies that are significant at any level should be admissible, unless this kind of evidence is going to be treated differently from all other evidence.
Whether the plaintiff's entire case, including the scientific studies, is sufficient is a different question, and in fact is the one the Court should have addressed.
25 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
26 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmeceuticals, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 572 (S.D. Cal.
1989); aff'd 951 F.2d 1128, 1129 (9th Cir. 1991).
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the Federal Rules of Evidence, 2 7 that the Federal Rules, in particular
Rule 702, superseded the Frye rule. Rule 702 provides a quite pragmatic justification for the admission of expert testimony: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise." 28 No mention is made here of the general acceptance
standard; the explicit standard is whether knowledge of virtually any
kind is likely to assist the trier of fact. As the Court recognized, Frye
did not survive the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Frye was not long interred; immediately following the announcement of its demise came the resurrection. To say that "scientific knowledge" that may be helpful to the trier of fact is
admissible is not to say what "scientific knowledge" is. In an effort
to help the lower courts that must now administer whatever Rule
702 stands for, the Court examined the nature of "scientific knowledge." In doing so it both largely adopted, although in different
terminology, the Frye rule, and engaged in an anachronistic discussion of the philosophy of science, one that has really remarkable implications if taken seriously.
As for the meaning of scientific knowledge and the Frye rule, the
Court noted four criteria that will help guide the lower courts in
making determinations of the admissibility of proffered expert testimony. Three of them either restate or are derivative of Frye, and the
fourth is merely a quite sensible admonition that is consistent with,
even if not strictly derivable from, Frye. The first criterion is
whether the subject matter may be tested:
Ordinarily, a key question to be answered in determing whether a theory or technique is scientific knowledge... will be whether it can be
(and has been) tested. "Scientific methodology today is based on generating hypotheses and testing them to see if they can be falsified; inis what distinguishes science from other fields
deed, this methodology
'29
of human inquiry."
The Court, in short, has adopted Karl Popper's conception of science. 30 Regrettably, as my student pointed out and as I discuss below, this is where the Court simply replaced a judicial anachronism
27 See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504 (1989); Bouraily v.
United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987). See also Edward.j. Imwinkelried, A BriefDefense of the
Supreme Court's Approach to the Interpretationof the FederalRules of Evidence, 27 IND. L. REV.

267 (1993).
28 FED. R. EvID. 702.

29 Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796 (quoting Green, supra note 20, at 645).
30 POPPER, supra note 21.
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with a philosophical one. More to the present point, attempts to
falsify propositions virtually exclusively take place within normal scientific endeavors, which means within the context of generally accepted scientific canons.
The Court's second criterion is "whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication. " 3' In addition to ruling out almost all legal knowledge as "scientific," this
guideline again will tend to limit material to that which is generally
accepted; rarely does unaccepted "science" get published. Third, in
determining whether data is sufficiently reliable to be admitted, a
court may also look to general acceptance.3 2 The first two standards
restate general acceptance; the third adopts it explicitly. The fourth
is merely that rate of error in scientific techniques is a prudential
consideration to be taken into account in the admissibility determination, a factor that if not taken into account by "scientists" would
seriously undermine the "general acceptance" of their work.
And so Frye lives, although in the guise of "guidelines" rather
than "rule." The change from the language of rules to that of
guidelines is probably positive, although not dramatically so. It
reduces the hiding places for judges, and will force them to focus
somewhat more explicitly on whether proffered testimony will be
helpful, which is to the good. Three difficulties remain, however.
The first is the Court's curiously unquestioning acceptance of Karl
Popper's philosophy of science, which perhaps is primarily of interest for its reminding us once again that the Court is best when it
sticks to law. The second is that Popper's theory has quite remarkable implications, such as suggesting that one of the most prevalent
forms of expert testimony is not admissible, at least not as "scientific" testimony. Third, the Court completely failed to address in
any meaningful way how the lower courts are supposed to implement the set of criteria the Court identified. I take these points in
turn.
The Court adopted uncritically the view that Popperian falsifiability is at the heart of modern science. The Court is clearly
correct that a substantial amount of what everyone would agree is
scientific activity is designed to test hypotheses by subjecting them
to potentially falsifying experiments. Nonetheless, the Court expressed no awareness of the controversial nature of Popper's views,
nor that much of what goes on in science is not captured by them.
Popper attempted to formulate a response-a confession and
31
32

Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797.
Id.
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avoidance really-to Hume's shattering insight that inductive logic
could not lead to justified knowledge. Hume's insight is simple to
explain. Much of knowledge is based on induction, on the summing
up of individual observations into general causal rules. When a
human observes something, however, the very question often is
whether that something is a function of a general causal relationship. Yet, we can never see causal relationships; all we can see is the
individual observation. To infer from individual observations that a
causal law is operating is to assume that causal laws exist, which is
precisely what the question is. That a bowling ball knocked down
the pins this time does not permit the inference that it will next time
because general causal laws are operating, for that is what we are
trying to determine. Only by assuming there are general causal laws
can we infer that a causal law is instantiated by our observation of
the bowling ball, yet to make such an inference is to go in a circle.
From the assumption of general causal laws, we infer general causal
laws. All such induction goes in a circle, and it is a vicious one:
[A]il inferences from experience suppose, as their foundation, that the
future will resemble the past and that similar powers will be conjoined
with similar sensible qualities. If there be any suspicion that the
course of nature may change, and that the past may be no rule for the
future, all experience becomes useless and can give rise to no inference or conclusion. It is impossible, therefore, that any arguments
from experience can prove this resemblance of the past to the future,
since all these
arguments are founded on the supposition of that
33
resemblance.
How then can we explain the progression of scientific knowledge? More basically, how can we understand science? Popper's
answer was to concede Hume's point that one cannot possess justified inductive knowledge that a theory is true, but Popper countered
that one can determine through empirical testing that it is false.
The role of the scientist, according to Popper, is to make bold hypotheses that lend themselves to empirical tests for falsification. For
example, if we can logically deduce from some hypothesis A that B
must be true, we can then test for B. If B is not true, then neither is
A (if A, then B; not-B; therefore, not-A). If B is true, we still do not
know much about A, except that it has survived this one test of falsification. If we are able to determine all conceivable tests of falsification, and if A withstands them all, we might actually stumble onto
knowledge that is as justifiable as the human condition permits.
Popper's work was extremely important to the philosophy of
33 DAVID HUME, AN INQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 24 (Eric Steinberg

ed., 1977).
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science in the middle part of this century, and it certainly captures
aspects of scientific endeavor, but it has problems as well. Most significantly, it suffers from the very problem it was designed to avoid.
Popper was attempting to avoid the problem of inductive inference,
of assuming that the future will be like the past, but his theory requires just that inference. Suppose A is hypothesized, and B is a
logical derivation of A. Suppose further that B is falsified by some
well run empirical test. That can be taken as a falsification of A only
if we assume that running similar tests in the future will come out as
did the one in the past-yet that is just the assumption that we are
trying to avoid. Popper's theory thus does not give a good reason to
reject a hypothesis for precisely the Humean reason.
Nor does it give a good reason to accept one. Consider two
hypotheses, A and X. Suppose A has been falsified by disproving B,
its logical derivative. We have no reason to believe X is true, and we
have a lot of reason to believe that eventually X will be falsified, too.
Why then prefer X to A even provisionally? Our knowledge is simply the result of the fortuity of our tests, our present insight, or our
ability to test one hypothesis now rather than the other. Popperian
theory thus gives us neither a reason to reject nor accept a
hypothesis.
Popper's theory is also an inadequate description of science and
scientists. Scientists do not believe that all they know are negatives;
they believe they know a lot of positive truths, and are learning
more every year. Most scientific work is designed to expand the
reach of scientific theories, to extend them into new domains, rather
than to falsify them. We were not building the particle accelerator
in Texas to falsify quantum theory; we were building it to find the
top quark, and thus to better understand the basic structure of matter. Nor is science characterized by bold theories following falsifying results. Hardly ever does a falsifying experiment result in the
jettisoning of a scientific theory; only if scientists cannot rework
their present theory to explain the anomalous results, and if a better
34
alternative is in sight, do scientists give up on a theory.
In the latter part of this century, a deep conceptual challenge
has arisen to Popper's theory. Thomas Kuhn recognized that in
most periods of science, scientists do indeed behave as though their
34 For example, what has come to be known as the Michelson Morley expirements
essentially disconfirmed Newtonian mechanics, and led to the theory of relativity. The
community of scientists did not discard Newtonian theory, however. The Michelson
Morley experiments were, in one scientist's words, "a cloud on a clear day." See Imre
Lakatos, Methodology of Scientific Falsificationand the Research Programmes, in CRITICISM AND
THE GRoWrH OF KNOWLEDGE 91, 159-165 (Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave eds., 1970).
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activity were governed by a set of rules, but after diligent search no
such rules could be found. The very deductive structure necessary
for Popper's theory defied identification, even though after science
has progressed the resultant knowledge is often expressed in deductive forms. 35 Kuhn found instead examplars, common problems of
theory application that seemed both to create the boundaries of a
field of inquiry and to contain within them much of the cognitive
content of the field. 36 Kuhn's theory has itself proven highly contro-

versial, 37 but whether right or wrong it has largely displaced falsificationist views as the object of philosophical inquiry in recent
decades. 38 Whatever the cause, the genius and more importantly
the limits of Popper's work are now clearly recognized. It was an
enormous leap forward, and certainly captures an aspect of scientific
endeavor, but to equate it with "science" is to be oblivious to three
decades of developments in the philosophy of science.
Perhaps the most curious implication of the Court's sanguine
discussion of falsifiability is that its adoption as the hallmark of "science" excludes a substantial portion of what is presently admitted as
expert testimony. One of the most prevalent forms of expert testimony is psychiatric testimony, much of which is heavily Freudian.
Little of Freudian psychiatry has been put to empirical testing, both
because of the resistance of its practitioners and because many of its
tenets defy falsifying experiments, as is true of many counseling
therapies. There have also been virtually no studies comparing the
effectiveness of psychotherapy to no intervention at all.3 9 Indeed,

Popper saw the debunking of Freudian psychiatry (along with Marxism) as one of the benefits of his work. 40 The debunking does not
stop with psychiatry, however. Many sciences cannot construct falsifying experiments. Both macro- and micro-economics are examples
where the task is often difficult, although not always impossible.
35 See, e.g., Norwood R. Hanson, The Logic of Discovery, 55J. Philosophy 1073, 1079

(1958).

36 Thomas S. Kuhn, Postscript, in THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 187

(1970).
37 See generally PAUL HOYNIGEN-HUENE, RECONSTRUCTING SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS:
THOMAS S. KUHN'S PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE (1993); WORLD CHANGES: THOMAS KUHN
AND THE NATURE OF SCIENCE (Paul Horwich ed., 1993).

38 Ian Hacking, in his review of Robert Nozick's new book The Nature of Rationality,
refers to himself, somewhat tongue in cheek to be sure, but only somewhat, "as the last
of the true Popperians." Ian Hacking, What's Best, 16 LONDON REVIEW OF BOOKS, Jan.

27, 1994, at 17.
39 For an interesting review of the status of freudian psychiatry, see Frederick Crews,
The Unknown Freud, NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, November 18, 1993, at 61; and the
responses to Crews in a subsequent issue, NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, Feb. 3, 1994, at

34-43.

40 POPPER, supra note 21, at 33-38.
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Other examples are sociology, anthropology, and astronomy. History, of course, is dearly left out of the circle of science in Popper's
view. We cannot rerun the French Revolution without Louis XVI to
see what might happen. Nor are historical speculations about the
intent of the framer's readily amendable to falsifying experiments.
Perhaps the Court meant to signal that empirically untested
counseling therapies were no longer to be admitted. Perhaps it
meant to cast into doubt the admissibility of historical research, or
at least to suggest that it was not admissible as science. More likely,
perhaps the Court was not fully aware of what it was doing and the
implications of the ideas with Which it was dealing. There is no intimation in Daubert that the Court was attempting to revolutionize the
substantive content of expert testimony. Moreover, what good does
falsifiability do at trial? Trials demand positive knowledge, just the
kind that Popper thought would come only after every conceivable
test has been done. The question in the Bendectin litigation is
whether the drug did or did not cause the birth defects, and the
decision had to be made at trial rather than at some indefinite time
in the future when all falsifying tests have been run.
Third, what are the lower courts to do now? I predict that they
will continue to apply the Frye rule under the disguise of the Court's
new vocabulary. 4 1 I predict this because the Court's opinion simply
ignored the issue that is presently informing the use of and fueling
the controversy over expert testimony. That issue is the tension between the conventional understanding of trials that demands that
fact finders be educated about the relevant facts and the use of experts that anticipates a large dose of deference to their opinions.
The most regrettable aspect of the Court's opinion in Daubert is that
it lost an opportunity to discuss this legal issue because of its flirtation with philosophical speculations about the nature of science.
Having not discussed the issue that drives contemporary problems,
the Court's decision will largely leave those problems unaffected
42
and undisturbed.
41 My colleague,Jon Waltz, pointed out that Daubert is likely to have a more dramatic
effect on litigants than courts. Daubert can be read broadly and narrowly, and presumably will be read differently by different judges. That is likely to lead to inconsistency in
application, and thus to forum shopping by litigants.
42 1 also predict that trial courts will incorrectly continue to make the sufficiency determination in the guise of the admissibility determination. See supra note 23. Yet another interesting aspect of this area is the special treatment that "scientific evidence"
gets in this regard. The explanation, I think, is that trial judges are admitting evidence
that they know they and jurors cannot be expected to understand. Such evidence should
not be admitted unless the trial judge is willing to let a verdict rest on it, and so the
admissibility decision becomes a sufficiency decision. This all confirms the entrenchment of a.deference mode of decision at the trial court level.
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The pressures that over time have resulted in modification of
the litigation process to permit large amounts of deference to experts continue to operate. First is the added cost of actually educating fact finders so that they may follow the reasoning of the expert
in the same way the fact finders can follow the reasoning of a lay
witness (thus essentially converting an expert into a lay witness).
There is in addition the lottery effect. If reasons need not be given
in detail for opinions, one has a chance of a lottery-effect jury verdict if the trial judge qualifies a witness as an expert. The only likely
effect of Daubert will be to transmute the present mechanical invocation of the Frye test into a more ostensibly subtle but in fact largely
identical process of qualification. In addition to expressing a conclusion about general acceptance, federal trial judges will now include what will become an equally mechanical statement that the
expertise will be helpful to decision. What else can they do? The
Supreme Court did not take its opportunity to tell trial judges to
admit purported expertise only if the basis of the expertise were understandable, as it could and should have done. Trial judges will
thus continue to look for a justification to defer to expertise, and
they will continue to find it in the general acceptance of that expertise in generally accepted bodies of knowledge.
I do not mean to say that Daubert will prove to be a completely
irrelevant decision, although I do believe it Will largely become so.
Telling the lower courts not to mechanically invoke "general acceptance" may prove marginally helpful, but none of the important
questions in the case were addressed. The conflict between the demands of education and deference were ignored, as was the conflict
between the assumptions of the law and the assumptions of quantitative science. Indeed, if anything the dichotomy between deference
and education was reinforced by the Court's opinion. The list of
criteria provided by the Court is only relevant to a system willing to
defer; by providing the list, the Court, although I am sure uninten43
tionally, gave sustenance to deference.
In my opinion, the most regrettable aspect of Daubert is that the
Court seemed quite unaware of the implications of admitting data
without a basis for believing that the data can be understood. By
doing so, it seems to be putting its stamp of approval on undeliberative and nonrational legal decision making, which I think to be the
43 This is also why the Court's limitation of its discussion to "scientific" evidence is
unproblematic. The other kinds of information listed in Rule 702 are unlikely to require
deference; information of those types can be explained. A car mechanic can qualify as
an expert under the rule, but few would claim that such expertise would defy the cognitive capacity of fact finders.
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antithesis of the law's aspirations. Jurors or judges who cannot understand the reasoning of a witness can only accept or reject the
witness' conclusions, but neither acceptance nor rejection will occur
rationally. The choice will not be made because a fact finder understands the reasoning and sees either its cogency or its flaws; it will
be made for some other reason. And the set of "some other reasons" is, from the point of view of the law's aspirations, filled with
unsavory characters.
Perhaps there is no (feasible) alternative. Perhaps the cost of
truly educating the fact finders would be too high, or perhaps my
skepticism about the point does not dispose of concerns about the
cognitive capacity of fact finders. If either is true, the answer again
is obvious: Unless I am also wrong about the core aspiration of litigation being decision through rational deliberation, the common
law form of decision making should not be employed.

